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IN RE ADOPTION/GUARDIANSHIP OF H.W.
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a juvenile court’s 
determination to terminate parental rights must be based on the statutory 
factors set forth in MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW (“FL”) § 5-323.  In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., 460 Md. 201, 213, 189 A.3d 284, 291 (2018). 
However, the court stated that the juvenile court’s use of custody factors did 
not prejudice the decision, as the factual findings made by the court were 
substantively similar to the findings under the necessary factors. Id. 
 H.W. was born in 2012 to S.B. (“Mother”) and M.W. (“Father”).  Prior to 
H.W.’s birth, Father was extradited out of the state and incarcerated.  At the
age of six-months, H.W. was hospitalized due to injuries sustained in Mother’s
care.  Following his injury, H.W. was declared to be a child in need of
assistance (“CINA”) by the juvenile court. H.W. was ultimately returned to
Mother’s custody.  After a subsequent incident in 2014 with a second child,
the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (“Department”) filed for
H.W. and his siblings to be removed from Mother’s care.  All three children
were found to be CINA, and were placed in Mr. and Mrs. M’s home for foster
care.
 After H.W. was placed in foster care, H.W.’s case worker, Lori Lee 
(“Lee”), attempted to locate Father, and learned that Father was incarcerated 
in another state.  Lee attempted to contact Father by mail in July of 2014, and 
did not receive a response.  In October of 2015, Father informed Lee he was 
incarcerated again for violating his probation.  That same year, the Department 
filed a Petition for Guardianship with the Right to Consent to Adoption or 
Long Term Care Short of Adoption for H.W.  A termination of parental rights 
(“TPR”) contested hearing was held in 2017. 
 During the TPR hearing, Lee testified to her attempted communications 
with Father in the prior years, as well as Father’s history of incarceration.  Lee 
also testified about her visits to the foster home, H.W.’s emotional attachment 
to his foster parents, H.W.’s bond to his siblings, and her belief that it would 
be detrimental to H.W.’s well-being to be removed from the foster home. 
Father testified, by phone, about his incarceration at the time, his inability to 
receive services for H.W.’s care, and his plan to remove H.W. from Baltimore 
if he were given custody.   
 The juvenile court examined the statutory factors set forth in FL § 5-323(d), 
and additional factors set out in Ross v. Hoffman. The additional factors were 
purely custodial factors, including the possible emotional effect on the child if 
custody was changed to the biological parent or the caretaker, and the stability 
and certainty as to the child’s future in the custody of the parent or the custody 
of the caretaker. 
     The juvenile court determined that the removal from the foster home would 
have a detrimental effect on H.W. because of the bonds that had been created 
and the stability and certainty with H.W.’s foster family; Father’s 
incarceration history; and Father’s plan to remove H.W. from his siblings.  The 
juvenile court held that, although there was not clear and convincing evidence 
that Father was unfit, there were exceptional circumstances that made the 
continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interests of 
H.W. The court awarded guardianship to the Department and terminated 
Father’s parental rights. 
     On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the juvenile court’s ruling. 
The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by examining and applying 
factors that were exclusive to child custody to terminate Father’s parental 
rights.  The court emphasized that because of the legal differences between a 
child custody case and a TPR case, child custody factors were not applicable 
to the court’s analysis.  The Department filed a petition for writ of certiorari 
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.  The issue before the court 
was whether the juvenile court was permitted to consider factors specific to 
custody determinations when contemplating the termination of parental rights. 
     The court began by examining the principles associated with TPR and the 
statutory requirements under FL § 5-323.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of 
H.W., at 216, 189 A.3d at 292.  First, the court acknowledged the constitutional
right of parents to raise and care for their children as they see fit, and the
presumption that it is in the best interests of a child to remain in the custody
of their parents. Id. (citing In re Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 402
Md. 477, 937 A.2d 177 (2007)).  The court also recognized that a parent’s
power and control of a child can be limited by the State’s interest in the
protection of a child when considering the child’s best interests. In re
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 216, 189 A.3d at 292.
 Next, the court looked to the relevant statutory provisions.  The court 
examined FL § 5-323(b), which provides a guide for the judiciary to balance 
the protection of parent’s rights and a child’s best interest in a TPR proceeding. 
In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 216, 189 A.3d at 292.   Specifically, 
FL § 5-323 states that the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that a legal parent is either unfit to continue in the role as parent, or that there 
are exceptional circumstances making the parental relationship harmful to the 
child’s best interests. Additionally, a finding that the termination of the 
parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child must be based on the factors 
in FL § 5-323(d).  Id. at 216, 189 A.3d 292-93 (citing MD. ANN. CODE, FAM.
LAW, § 5-323(b), MD. ANN. CODE, FAM. LAW, § 5-323(d)). The court noted 
that although the statute sets forth a list of factors for consideration, FL § 5-
323(d) does not contemplate that the statutory factors are exclusive. In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 219-20, 189 A.3d at 294-95. 
     Next the court examined what additional factors would be permissible to 
consider in a TPR proceeding. In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 220-
21, 189 A.3d at 295-96.  The court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals 
that factors specific to custody are not applicable in TPR cases.  Id. at 223, 189 
A.3d at 296-97.  The court examined Maryland’s case law comparing TPR and
custody hearings, and reiterated that the unfitness and exceptional
circumstances analysis in TPR cases differs from the court’s analysis in
custody cases.  Id. at 231, 189 A.3d at 301.  The court explained that if custody
factors are incorporated into the analysis in a TPR case, the court’s risk
allowing third-party custodians to have an equal claim to the child against a
natural parent.  Id. at 226, 189 A.3d at 298.  The court cautioned that when
there is consideration of factors that are not required by the statute, the factors
used must be specially tailored to the parental relationship and the child’s best
interests, rather than custody.  Id. at 231-32, 189 A.3d at 301-02.  The court
indicated that this was to solidify the requirement that all findings must be
based on the parent’s detrimental relationship with the child.  Id. at 232, 189
A.3d at 302.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the juvenile
court’s use of custody-specific factors was not an abuse of discretion.  In re 
Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 231-32, 189 A.3d at 302.  The juvenile 
court applied the relevant facts to both the custody-specific factors and 
statutory factors to terminate Father’s rights. Id. at 226-31, 189 A.3d at 299-
301. Here, the court found that a bulk of the conclusions made using the
custody-specific factors were duplicative of the findings under the required
statutory factors.  Id. at 232, 189 A.3d at 302.
 Judge Hotten wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part 
with the majority’s opinion.  In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., at 234, 189 
A.3d at 303.  While Hotten agreed with the Majority that using factors outside
the TPR statute in the final determination could be harmful, he disagreed that
the use here was not an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion.  Id. at 234-35,
189 A.3d at 303. Hotten argued that the use of custody-specific factors could
lead to a finding of exceptional circumstances where there are not any, and
may bolster a finding based on a pre-determined goal to terminate parental
rights.  Id. at 240, 189 A.3d at 307.
 In In re Adoption/Guardianship of H.W., the Court of Appeals found that 
when a juvenile court applied factors that were exclusive to custody in a TPR 
proceeding, there was no abuse of discretion when its findings under the 
custody factors were substantively similar to the findings under the factors in 
FL § 5-323.  The holding of this case serves as an explicit caution to attorneys 
and juvenile courts to carefully argue and apply factors outside the scope of 
the termination of parental rights.  Considering the high standard applied to 
the termination of parental rights and the similarity to custody determinations, 
it can be too easy to confuse the applicable factors and risk improperly 
severing a parental relationship.  
